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THE IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURE
ON WAGES, FRINGE BENEFITS, AND TURNOVER
JAMES E. LONG and ALBERT N. LINK*
This paper examines the relationship between labor compensation and the
structure of the product market, which is measured by the industry concentra-
tion ratio and by dummy variables for the existence and type of government
regulation. Unlike previous studies that have estimated the impact of concen-
tration and regulation on wages or earnings, this study extends the analysis to
include the effect of market structure on employer-provided pensions and in-
surance and on voluntary labor turnover. The hypothesis that product
market power raises labor compensation is supported by empirical results
indicating that concentration increases wages and fringes but lowers volun-
tary labor turnover. Regulations that set minimum prices and restrict entry
raise labor compensation, since wage premiums due to regulation are not off-
set by lower pensions and insurance or higher turnover. Other forms of
regulation, such as profit regulation in public utilities, are found to reduce
labor compensation, as evidenced by higher turnover or lower wages and
fringes, or both.
A LARGE number of studies have exam-ined the impact of product market
structure on labor earnings. It has been sug-
gested that firms witb market power pay
relatively bigber wages because (1) work-
ers in concentrated industries capture part
of tbe monopoly profits, (2) labor costs in
concentrated industries can be more easily
passed on to consumers, and (3) tbe small
number of firms in concentrated industries
makes it easier for unions to organize and
raise wages. Empirical evidence on tbe
relationsbip between concentration and
•James Long is an associate professor of economics
at Auburn University and Albert Link is a professor of
economics at the University of North Carolina at
Greensboro,
wages is mixed, bowever. Weiss, Masters,
Hawortb and Rasmussen, Asbenfelter and
Jobnson, and Hendricks find tbat con-
centration bas no statistically significant
effect on wages once industrial character-
istics and employee quality are held con-
stant.' In contrast, Dalton and Ford esti-
'Leonard Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earn-
ings," American Economic Review, Vol, 56, No, 1
(March 1966), pp, 96- 117; Stanley H, Masters, "Wages
and Plant Size: An Interindustry Analysis," Review
of Economic? and Statistics, Vol, 51, No, 3 (August
1969), pp, 341-45; Charles T, Haworth and David
W, Rasmussen, "Human Capital and Inter-Industry
Wages in Manufacturing," Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol, 53, No, 4 (November 1971), pp,376-80;
Orley Ashenfelter and George E, Johnson, "Unionism,
Relative Wages and Labor Quality in U,S, Manu-
facturing Industries," International Economic Re-
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 36, No, 2 (January 1983), <
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1983 by Cornell University,
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mate that firms in concentrated industries
pay higher wages than competitive firms, a
relationship Haworth and Reuther find
occurring only during cyclical periods of
slack demand and stable prices.^ In sum-
marizing the effects of market structure
on wages, Hendricks points out that the esti-
mated effect of concentration depends on
the control variables and samples used and
on the occupations and time periods exam-
ined.'
To the extent that government regu-
lation can affect the pricing policies and
structure of industries, product market
regulation is another potential influence
on labor earnings. For example, by limiting
the entry of firms into the market, regula-
tion may reduce competition and enable
unions to raise wages above the level that
would have existed in the absence of regu-
lation. The resistance of firms to demands
for higher wages may be increased, how-
ever, by regulations that set maximum
prices to insure minimum profits. Hend-
ricks investigates the effect of regulation
on earnings and finds that annual earnings
are lower in regulated industries than in
unregulated manufacturing, a result that
is consistent with Weiss's findings.^ Never-
theless, labor earnings are relatively higher
in industries in which regulatory authori-
ties set minimum prices and restrict entry,
as in trucking and airlines.^ Also, Ehrenberg
view, Vol, 13, No, 3 (October 1972), pp, 488-507;
and Wallace Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor
Earnings," Belt Journal of Economics, Vol, 8, No, 2
(Autumn 1977), pp, 483-96,
2James A, Dalton and E, J, Ford, "Concentration
and Labor Earnings in Manufacturing and Utilities,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 31, No, 1
(October 1977), pp, 45- 60, and James A, Dalton and
E, J, Ford, "Concentration and Professional Earnings
in Manufacturing," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol, 31, No, 3 (April 1978), pp, 379-84;
Charles T. Haworth and Carol Jean Reuther, "Indus-
trial Concentration and Interindustry Wage Deter-
mination," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol,
60, No, 1 (February 1978), pp, 85-95,
'Wallace Hendricks, "Unionism, Oligopoly, and
Rigid Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol, 63, No, 2 (May 1981), pp, 198-205,
••Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings,"
and Weiss, "Concentration and Labor Earnings,"
'See, for example, Hendricks, "Regulation and
Labor Earnings," and Thomas C, Moore, "The Bene-
ficiaries of Trucking Regulation," Journal of Law and
estimates that telephone industry employ-
ees in New York have substantially higher
earnings than other comparable employ-
ees in the state,^
These studies differ in the data bases,
variable definitions, and time periods used,
which complicates any direct comparison
of their results. Yet, one factor is common
to all these studies: they have focused almost
exclusively on wages or nominal earnings.
None, that is, directly considers the influ-
ence of market structure on nonwage com-
pensation such as fringe benefits. Employer
contributions to employee pension and in-
surance plans have grown rapidly in recent
years and now average close to 10 percent of
wages and salaries; in large manufacturing
firms, the percentage is much higher.'
Ideally, for estimating the social costs of
market imperfections, one would want to
know the impact of concentration and
regulation on the total (wage plus non-
wage) compensation of workers.
Three empirical issues are therefore con-
sidered in this paper. First, we examine
the impact of market structure on wage
levels, using a data base that has some im-
portant advantages over those used in previ-
ous studies. Second, we analyze the relation-
ship among concentration, regulation,
and employer expenditures on private
pension and insurance funds. And finally,
we estimate the effect of market structure
on labor turnover, holding constant the
influence of concentration and regulation
on wage rates.
Market Structure and Wages
Inadequate control for worker "quality"
can bias the regression estimates of the net
Economics, Vol, 21, No, 2(October 1978), pp, 327-44,
'Ronald G, Ehrenberg, The Regulatory Process
and Labor Earnings (New York: Academic Press,
1979), pp, 69-90,
'For evidence, see James E, Long and Frank A, Scott,
"The Income Tax and Nonwage Compensation,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol, 64, No, 2
(May 1982), pp, 211-19, The 10 percent figure
applies to voluntary rather than legally required
employer contributions, such as OASDHL For a sur-
vey of employee fringe benefits by industry, see Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States, Employee
Benefits 1980 (Washington, D,C,: Chamber of Com-
merce, 1981),
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impact of market structure on wages. Eor
this reason, National Longitudinal Survey
(NLS) data have some desirable properties
for wage analyses. Eirst, the NLS contains
data on actual firm-specific work experi-
ence and prior employment history, along
with other important productivity controls
such as educational attainment, duration
of job training, and health status. Second,
the NLS reports individuals' hourly wage
rates, which can be used as dependent vari-
ables in wage equations. Other studies have
resorted to industry averages or have prox-
ied individual wage rates with annual earn-
ings standardized for time worked.* Of
course, the NLS data are not without draw-
backs, namely, the small sample sizes and
narrow age ranges.
We have taken the NLS sample of mature
males (aged forty-five to fifty-nine in 1966)
and estimated wage equations with the
natural logarithm of the hourly wage in
1966 as the dependent variable. The inde-
pendent variables are years of work experi-
ence with the current employer, £XP; ex-
perience squared, EXP^; years of formal
schooling, EDUC; months of job-related
training, TRAIN; a dummy variable equal
to one if health limits working and equal to
zero if otherwise, HLTH; a dummy variable
equal to one if married with spouse present
and zero if otherwise, MSP; a dummy vari-
able equal to one if white and zero if other-
wise, WHITE; dummy variables for region,
SOUTH and WEST; the percent of work-
ers in the industry covered by collective bar-
gaining, [/;' the percent of the industry that
'Researchers using the tapes from the 1970 Census
1-1000 Public Use Sample measure annual hours
worked as the product of current weekly hours of work
and weeks worked for the prior year (with both hours
and weeks measured as intervals), a practice tbat
may bias estimates of tbe hourly wage rate.
'The unionization figures refer to the percent of all
production workers in the industry covered by col-
lective bargaining during the period 1968-72, as
estimated from the Expenditures for Employee Com-
pensation Survey administered by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. These data can be found in Richard
B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "New Estimates of
Private Sector Unionism in the United States," Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jan-
uary 1979), pp. 143-74.
Ideally, we would like to have information on the
union status of each individual in the sample, but
is employed in plants having 500 or more
employees, LGFIRM; the industry con-
centration ratio, C;'" the interaction be-
tween unionization and concentration,
U'C; and dummy variables for regulated
industries, REG, MAX, MIN, and F^R."
Our sample is restricted to 1,514 wage and
salary employees in private, regulated in-
dustries and unregulated manufacturing.
The regression results appear in Table 1.
The basic earnings model. Equation 1,
explains over 40 percent of the variation
in 1966 wages; and all of the control vari-
ables for employee and industry character-
istics are statistically significant with the
expected signs. The coefficients of C and
U'C are highly significant and their signs
indicate that concentration raises wages
although its impact diminishes with union-
ization.'^ A unit increase in concentration
raises wages by .345, .245, .145, and .045
percent at unionization levels of 20, 40, 60,
and 80 percent, respectively." Thus, at a
sucb infonnation is not provided in the census data
used by Weiss and Hendricks or in the NLS data for
the year 1966. Such data are available in the 1971 NLS,
bowever, and we have compared the wage equation
parameters when the industry level of unionization is
replaced by a dummy variable for union membersbip
(more correctly, coverage of tbe individual by a collec-
tive bargaining contract). These results indicate that
the coefficients of the concentration and regulation
variables do notvary witb the measure of unionization.
'"Concentration estimates for the industry categories
in the NLS sample were kindly provided by Wallace
Hendricks.
"M/IX denotes industries in which maximum prices
are regulated (telephone, electricity, gas and steam,
water); MIN denotes industries in which minimum
prices are regulated and also entry is restricted (air
transportation, trucking); and VAR denotes all otber
regulated industries (railroad, bus, taxicab, ware-
housing, water transportation, services incidental to
transportation, radio and television, and sanitary).
REG includes all of these regulated industries. See
Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," pp.
485-87, for a discussion of the primary regulatory
authority and its powers in various industries.
'2A negative relationship between wages and [/• C
was also found by Weiss, "Concentration and Labor
Earnings"; Frederic M. Sherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance, 2d ed. (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1980), p. 359; and Hendricks, "Union-
ism, Oligopoly, and Rigid Wages."
I'These estimates are obtained by evaluating the
expression
3 WAGE/ dC = .00445 - .00005 U.
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Table L Regression Analyses of the Effect of
Concentration and Regulation on Wage
Rates, 1966.
(^-values in parentheses)
Variables
C
u.c
REG
MAX
MIN
VAR
U
LGFIRM
EXP
EXP^
MSP
EDUC
TRAIN
SOUTH
WEST
WHITE
Constant
R̂
F-level
N
Equation 1
,00445**
(3,06)
- ,00005*
(-2,41)
- ,01804
(-,60)
—
,00436**
(3,39)
,33277*
(2,36)
,01216**
(4,72)
- ,00012
(-1,78)
,09119**
(2,92)
,04275**
(14,72)
,00204**
(3,50)
-,14971**
(-6,89)
,14187**
(5,25)
,15275**
(6,90)
4,57168**
(50,50)
,4250
85,52
1514
Equation 2
,00492**
(3,42)
-,00003
(-1,72)
—
-,00211
(-,04)
,14863**
(3,24)
-,16692**
(-4,27)
,00349**
(2,62)
,2393
(1,71)
,01197**
(4,69)
-,00011
(-1,57)
,09882**
(3,19)
,04156**
(14,45)
,00208**
(3,62)
-,14113**
(-6,55)
,14673**
(5,49)
,14882**
(6,77)
4,57487**
(50,86)
,4395
78,29
1514
unionization level of 70 percent (the sample
mean), wages in high-concentration indus-
tries (C equals 70 percent) are 4.75 percent
higher than wages in low-concentration in-
dustries (C equals 20 percent). In contrast,
the wage differential between high-union-
ization {U equals 70 percent) and low-
unionization industries {U equals 20
percent) is 8.8 percent at the mean con-
centration level of 52 percent.
In Equation 2, the single dummy variable
for industry regulation {REG) is replaced
by separate variables for the specific type of
regulation {MAX, MIN, and VAR). The
estimated coefficients of the concentration
terms now imply a much larger impact of
market power on wages—about a 14 percent
wage differential between high- and low-
concentration industries. Controlling for
the specific type of industry regulation is
thus important in estimating the net impact
of concentration on wages, as well as in
estimating the union wage effect (which
increases to 9.6 percent in Equation 2).
The finding that concentration raises
wages is very robust and does not depend
on cyclical factors such as high unemploy-
ment and stable prices, as suggested by
Haworth and Reuther, or on concentra-
tion's being less than some critical value,
as estimated by Dalton and Ford.'* This
conclusion (as well as those of previous
studies) should he tempered, however, hy
the recognized weaknesses of concentration
ratios, including the fact that the industry
definitions used in their measurement are
arbitrary and do not necessarily conform
*Significant at the ,05 level in a two-tailed test,
**Significanl at the ,01 level in a two-tailed test.
''Haworth and Reuther, in "Industrial Concentra-
tion and Interindustry Wage Determination," find
the concentration impact on wages to be positive and
significant only during a recessionary period. The
year 1966 was one of low unemployment (2,9 percent).
When our wage equations were estimated with NLS
data for 1971, a year of high unemployment (5,0 per-
cent), the impacts of high concentration and MIN-
regulation on wages were similar to those reported in
Table 1 and equally significant,
Dalton and Ford, in "Concentration and Labor
Earnings," estimate that increases in concentration
above the 50 percent level do not affect manufac-
turing wages. We find that estimating the wage equa-
tions with concentration-squared terms leaves the
estimated wage differentials between high- and low-
concentration industries virtually unchanged.
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to economic markets and also the fact that
no information is provided about the mar-
ket shares of individual firms.
The estimated coefficient of REG in
Equation 1 is not statistically different
from zero, wbicb indicates that wages do not
differ between regulated industries and un-
regulated manufacturing, once human
capital, location, and industry character-
istics are held constant. The estimates in
Equation 2 substantiate Hendricks's hy-
pothesis that a single dummy variable mis-
represents the wage impact of industry
regulation.'5 Regulation has no effect, for
example, on wages in utility industries in
which maximum prices {MAX) are set and
entry is restricted, such as the telephone,
electricity, gas and steam, and water indus-
tries. This finding suggests that the impact
on labor costs of "cost price-through"
utility pricing schemes is offset by the in-
flexibility of rate changes due to regulatory
lags.'^
Setting minimum prices (MIN) and con-
trolling entry into tbe market, on the other
hand, raises wages by about 15 percent,
suggesting tbat union power in air trans-
portation and trucking is increased by regu-
lations that reduce competition from non-
union labor. Finally, wages are nearly 17
percent lower in railroads, local passenger
transit, warehousing, radio and television,
and other industries in wbich regulatory
practices are more varied {VAR) and have
not altered market structure and pricing
policies in ways tbat might increase union
power.
Assigning the degree and type of regula-
tion to an industry also involves some
arbitrary judgments that qualify the infer-
ences drawn from the coefficients of the
regulation variables. In addition, a problem
in interpreting the coefficient of MIN is
that air transportation and trucking are in-
dustries characterized by spatial production
limitations that act to curb the entry of new
firms outside the union's jurisdiction. In
long-line trucking, for example, a union
firmly established in a few key cities within
a region will be protected from nonunion
competition because new entrants must
almost always operate in the same key
cities. Levinson argues that these spatial
limitations of production, rather than the
control of entry by regulatory authorities,
are responsible for the Teamsters' success
in raising wages.^'
In this paper, we are unable to determine
which entry barrier—spatial production
limitations or regulation—is more im-
portant in raising wages in air transporta-
tion and trucking.'^ Nonetheless, we be-
lieve it is important to include the regula-
tion variables in the wage equation, if for no
other reason than to serve as controls for
estimating the wage impact of concentra-
tion.
Since the earnings model includes a num-
ber of control variables for worker quality
and industry characteristics, the findings in
Table 1 suggest tbat employees in high-
concentration and M/N-regulation indus-
tries receive economic rent in the form of
wage premiums. Tbe correct measure for
determining whether workers receive eco-
nomic rent, however, is total labor compen-
sation, wbicb equals wages and salaries
plus sucb nonwage compensation as em-
ployer-provided fringe benefits (pensions
and health insurance), job satisfaction, and
employment stability. The impact of mar-
ket structure on nonwage compensation is
'^Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings."
"For additional discussion, ̂  see Ehrenberg, The
Regulatory Process and Labor Earnings, pp. 11-12.
"Harold M. Levinson, "Unionism, Concentration,
and Wage Changes: Toward A tJnified Theory,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 20, No.
2 (January 1967), pp. 198- 205.
'*Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that
the latter effect may dominate. Moore, "The Bene-
ficiaries of Trucking Regulation," argues that the
operating-ratio regulation in trucking tends to in-
crease labor costs, aside from any additional union
strength due to reduced competition from nonunion
drivers. Empirically, the annual growth in hourly
earnings in trucking has slowed considerably since
1977, relative to earnings growth during earlier years
and relative to manufacturing wage increases since
1977. Entry into trucking has been less restricted since
1977, particularly for short-haul carriers, and de-
regulation policies have been gaining support. Since
there is little reason to expect that spatial production
limitations have changed radically since 1977, the
relatively slower wage growth in trucking may reflect
the influence of greater competition.
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examined in the following sections of the
paper.
Market Structure and Fringe Benefits
Data on one form of nonwage compensa-
tion—voluntary employer contributions for
pension and profit-sharing plans and for
group health and life insurance—can be
derived from U.S. Department of Commerce
estimates of employee compensation by
industry.'8 In estimating the relationship
between market structure and employer
expenditures on these fringe benefits, it is
important to control for those determinants
of fringe benefits that correlate with con-
centration and regulation. The variables
expected to affect fringes have already been
discussed in detail elsewhere, so only a brief
description of the model is presented here.^"
Fringe benefits should vary positively
with total employee compensation because
of tbe positive income elasticity of demand
for fringes and the positive tax-rate elas-
ticity that results from the preferential tax
treatment of fringe benefits.^' Unionization
is thought to have a positive effect on fringe
benefits, since union leaders can inform
their members of the tax advantages of
fringe benefits and of the cost savings of
group insurance and since employee prefer-
"U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, Vol. 59, No. 7 (July 1979), pp. 54-55. Vol-
untary employer contributions for pensions and insur-
ance were estimated by first subtracting wages and
salaries from total employee compensation and then
subtracting tbe legally required employer con-
tributions to OASDHI. OASDHI payments by industry
were calculated as (.mOb)(WAGE)(FTE) for WAGE >
517,700 or ($1,071) (FTE) for WAGE <' $17,700, where
WA GE is average annual wage and salary earnings per
full-time employee and FTE is total industry full-time
employment.
2»See Robert G. Rice, "Skill, Earnings, and the
Growth of Wage Supplements," American Economic
Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May 1966), pp. 583-93;
Bevars Mabry, "The Economics of Fringe Benefits,"
Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 1973),
pp. 95- 106; Richard B. Freeman, "Tbe Effect of
Unionism on Fringe Benefits," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July 1981), pp.
489-509; and Long and Scott, "The Income Tax
and Nonwage Compensation."
2'See John S. Nolan, "Taxation of Fringe Benefits,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September
1977), pp. 359-68.
ences for fringe benefits can be directly
transmitted to management by collective
bargaining. Because of rate differentials be-
tween group and individual health or life
insurance policies, fringe benefits should
vary directly with firm size, assuming the
demand for group insurance is price-elastic.
Employers may have a preference for certain
types of fringe benefits that reduce labor
turnover, sucb as nonvesting pension plans
or paid vacations whose length increases
with tenure. These kinds of fringe benefits
are most likely to be offered when turnover
costs are high, which is the case if much of
employees' human capital is firm-specific.
The impact of concentration and regula-
tion on fringe benefits is obtained by esti-
mating the equation:
(1) FBi =a +bC, +cRi + dXi ,
where FB, is annual voluntary employer
expenditures in 1978 on pensions, profit
sharing, and insurance, measured as dollars
per full-time employee; C; is the industry
concentration ratio; /?, consists of dummy
variables indicating the existence and type
of regulation, as defined earlier; and the
vector X, includes the control variables
TOTCOMP (average annual total com-
pensation per employee), FIRMSZ (average
firm size), KLRA TIO (the ratio of capital to
labor), U (the percent of industry employees
covered by collective bargaining), and U'C
(an interaction between unionization and
concentration). Data for these variables are
available for twenty-eight two- and three-
digit industries, which include manufac-
turing, transportation, communication,
and public utilities.^^ The ordinary least
'^Concentration ratios for two-digit manufactur-
ing industries came from William G. Shepherd, The
Economics of Industrial Organization (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 202. Concentra-
tion data for regulated industries were provided by
Wallace Hendricks. For two industries (local and
inter-urban passenger transit and trucking and ware-
housing), it was necessary to average his data for cen-
sus industries (using industry employment as weights)
to match the Department of Commerce industry defi-
nitions. Average firm size was measured as the num-
ber of employees per establisbment in 1977, as re-
ported in the U.S. Bureau of Census, County Business
Pattems 1977, United States Summary, CBP-79-1
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square estimates of tbe model are reported in
Table 2.2'
Table 2. Regression Analyses of tbe Effect of
Concentration and Regulation on
Employer Contributions for Pensions and
Group Insurance, 1978.
(^-values in parentheses)
Variables
C
u«c
REG
MAX
MIN
VAR
U
TOTCOMP
FIRMSZ
KLRATIO
Constanl
R̂
F-level
N
Equation 1
-31.189*
(-2.55)
.854**
(3.90)
- 626.523
(-1.67)
—
—
—
-11.516
(-.81)
.085*
(2.44)
4.205
(1.92)
129.576**
(5.72)
317.782
(.51)
.936
41.51
28
Equation 2
- 19.804
(-1.48)
.653*
(2.64)
—
-230.861
(-.37)
-401.641
(-1.03)
-986.703*
(-2.09)
-.086
(-.01)
.072
(1.99)
3.904
(1.75)
124.217**
(5.24)
21.618
(.03)
.946
35.26
28
*Significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Significatit at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.
(Washington, D.C: GPO, 1979), pp. 1-2. TOT-
COMP and KLRATIO (which is proxied by the ratio
of corporate capital consumption allowances to in-
dustry employment) came from the LI.S. Department
of Gommerce. Survey of Current Business, Vol. 59,
No. 7 (July 1979), pp. 54, 55, and 60. tjnionizationdata
are from Freeman and Medoff, "New Estimates of
Private Sector Llnionism in the LInited States."
"Freeman, in "The Effect of Unionism on Fringe
Benefits," p. 498, has pointed out that Equation
Tbe concentration terms are bigbly sig-
nificant in Equation 1, wbich includes only
tbe single regulation variable. Tbe co-
efficients of C and U'C indicate tbat product
market power raises fringe benefits, once
unionization exceeds 37 percent.̂ ^ Tbe
marginal effects of concentration on fringe
benefits are - 14, +3, +20, and +37 dollars at
unionization levels of 20, 40, 60, and 80
percent, respectively. At a unionization level
of 44 percent (tbe sample mean), tberefore,
pension and insurance contributions are
|320 bigber in bigb-concentration (C
equals 70 percent) tban in low-concentra-
tion (C equals 20 percent) industries. Wben
tbe tbree regulation variables are included
in place of REG, as in Equation 2, tbe abso-
lute values of tbe concentration coefficients
are diminisbed; but tbe U'C term,bow-
ever, remains positive and bigbly signifi-
cant. Tbe estimates indicate tbat market
power raises fringe benefits at unionization
levels above 31 percent; at tbe mean level,
employer contributions for pensions and in-
surance are $425 bigber in bigb- tban in
low-concentration industries. Tbe impact
of concentration on fringe benefits is tbus
mucb smaller tban tbe $1,575 effect due to
unionization.^*
1 is subject to simultaneity bias since TOTCOMP
includes voluntary employer contributions for fringe
benefits along with wages and salaries plus legally
required supplements. Gorrecting for this problem, as
he suggests, does not appreciably change our estimates
of the impact of concentration and regulation on
fringe benefits. Gonsequently, the corrected estimates
are not reported in the text.
2*Note that the positive and significant coefficient
of U'C in Table 2 contrasts with that observed in
Table I and in other wage studies. Together, these re-
sults indicate that in highly concentrated industries,
increased unionization raises the sbare of total com-
pensation allocated to fringe benefits—a finding
consistent with the theory and evidence presented by
Freeman, "Tbe Effect of Unionism on Fringe Bene-
fits." The tax savings from fringe benefits increase
witb concentration; and unions can inform members
of the advantages of fringes and make worker prefer-
ences concerning the compensation mix known to
management.
2*Tbis estimate assumes a concentration level of 49
percent (the sample mean) and a unionization differ-
ential of 50 percent (for example, U equals 70 percent
relative to U equals 20 percent).
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When measured by a single variable,
industry regulation reduces fringe benefits
by $627, although the statistical significance
of REG is marginal. Equation 2 suggests
that the negative effect of regulation on
fringes should not be attributed to all types
of regulation. Pension and insurance con-
tributions are relatively lower (by |987)
only under VAR-type regulation, in which
authorities do not consistently restrict entry
or set minimum and maximum prices.
We know of no previous studies that have
related fringe benefit expenditures to con-
centration and regulation; consequently,
there are no benchmarks against which our
estimates can be compared. Moreover, since
we use aggregate industry data, our con-
clusions should be regarded as tentative. In
the next section we propose an alternative
test to determine the influence of concen-
tration and regulation on nonwage com-
pensation.
Market Structure and Labor Turnover
An alternative method for estimating the
effect of market structure on nonwage com-
pensation is derived from the assumption
that, other things equal, individuals will
quit their present jobs if they perceive that
an alternative job offers a net advantage.
If concentration or regulation generates
positive (negative) economic rent in terms
of higher (lower) wage or nonwage returns,
workers in concentrated or regulated indus-
tries will therefore be less (more) likely to
quit and move to other jobs than workers in
competitive industries. Interindustry turn-
over differentials not resulting from wage
differences among concentrated, regulated,
and competitive industries can thus be as-
sumed to result from differences in nonwage
compensation.26
2'A number of recent studies have used turnover
data to analyze nonwage differentials by race and
union status. For example, see Duane E, Leigh,
"Unions and Nonwage Racial Discrimination,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 32, No,
4 (July 1979), pp, 439-50; and Richard B, Freeman,
"The Effects of Unionism on Worker Attachment to
Firms," Journal of Labor Research, Vol, 1, No, 1
(Spring 1980), pp, 29-62, James E, Long has used
quit behavior to estimate whether government workers
The impact of market structure on labor
turnover has not been extensively re-
searched, Hendricks indicates that regulated
industries offer more stable employment
than manufacturing, and Ehrenberg reports
that quit rates are much lower for New York
Telephone employees than for workers in
manufacturing industries. Nevertheless,
neither conclusion is supported by multi-
variate analysis that controls for nonregula-
tion variables that influence turnover.^'
Other empirical studies have found a
significant, negative relationship between
concentration and the industry's average
annual quit rate. Burton and Parker suggest
that quits are inversely related to concentra-
tion because (1) the relatively high profits of
concentrated industries may allow those
firms to use labor in an inefficient (in other
words, X-efficient) manner, which may be a
characteristic of employment that is attrac-
tive to workers; (2) the fewness of firms raises
the probability of collusive no-raiding
agreements as well as reduces alternatives
for intra-industry mobility; and (3) fringe
benefits may be higher in concentrated
industries.28 Parsons argues that entrance
into high-concentration, high-wage indus-
tries generally requires investments by the
worker, which may diminish the tendency
to quit.29
These concentration-turnover findings
came from regression models of the form
(2) QR= )So+ fi,W+ I3,A + ^ , 2 ,
where QR is the industry quit rate, W is the
current wage, A represents alternative job
possibilities, and Z is a vector of other deter-
are overpaid relative to private sector employees, in
"Are Government Workers Overpaid? Alternative
Evidence," Journal of Human Resources, Vol, 17,
No, 1 (Winter 1982), pp, 123-31,
"Hendricks, "Regulation and Labor Earnings," p,
492; Ehrenberg, The Regulatory Process and Labor
Earnings, pp, 108- 110,
28John F, Burton and John E, Parker, "Interindustry
Variations in Voluntary Labor Mobility," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol, 22, No, 2 (January
1969), pp, 199-216,
"Donald O, Parsons, "Specific Human Capital: An
Application to Quit Rates and Layoff Rates," Journal
of Political Economy, Vol, 80, No, 5 (November/
December 1972), pp, 1120-43,
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minants of the quit rate (such as pensions,
race, gender, and concentration). This
specification can be criticized on two
grounds. First, using industry aggregates as
the units of observation introduces a simul-
taneous-equation bias because it is ambigu-
ous whether Equation 2 is a supply or de-
mand relationship,'" With individual work-
ers as the unit of observation, however.
Equation 2 can be treated as a supply rela-
tionship, because the compensation levels
facing individual workers are exogenous to
them, A second statistical problem is the
inclusion of wages as an explanatory vari-
able, Flanagan argues that this introduces
multicoUinearity (since wages may be re-
lated to race, gender, concentration, and
other explanatory variables) and a simul-
taneity problem (employers may pay lower
wages to workers more likely to quit, for
example)."
With these problems in mind, we esti-
mate the relationship between market
structure and voluntary turnover using the
following model specified by Flanagan:'^
(3) a = /8o+ J8,(M .̂- - M )̂+ /̂ 2 2 , .
where Q, is the quit behavior of the indi-
vidual, Wi is the individual's current wage,
W is the mean market wage for workers with
similar human capital and wage-related
characteristics, and Z, contains other deter-
minants of quit behavior. The probability
of quitting the current employer is assumed,
other things equal, to increase as the differ-
ence between the actual current wage and
the "potential" market wage (hereafter,
RESID) decreases. For our analysis, the
vector Z includes dummy variables indicat-
ing whether the current employer is in a
regulated industry {REG, MAX, MIN, or
VAR); the concentration ratio (C) in the
individual's current (three-digit census)
industry; unionization {UNION) in the
'"For further discussion, see Schiller and Weiss,
"The Impact of Private Pensions on Firm Attach-
ment," p, 379,
"Robert J, Flanagan, "Discrimination Theory,
Labor Turnover, and Racial Unemployment Differ-
entials," Journal of Human Resources, Vol, 13, No,
2 (Spring 1978), pp, 187-207,
"Ibid,
current industry; years of work experience
with the current employer {TENURE);
and dummy variables for married with
spouse present {MSP) and race {WHITE).
If high concentration and regulation gen-
erate positive (negative) economic rents, the
coefficients of C and the regulation vari-
ables are expected to be negative (positive)
and statistically significant. Since the effects
of concentration and regulation on the cur-
rent wage will be held constant by the
RESID term, negative coefficients on the
market-structure variables will indicate that
concentration and regulation raise non-
wage compensation. From previous studies,
we expect the quit probability to vary in-
versely with TENURE, MSP, and UNION
and directly with WHITE.
Turnover data for individual workers
and for the explanatory variables required to
estimate Equation 3 were obtained from the
National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of
middle-aged men (aged forty-five to fifty-
nine)," In the NLS, individuals are asked
to compare their employers at two consecu-
tive survey dates and to indicate whether
any change in employers is due to a volun-
tary quit or to layoff or dismissal. In the
sample of middle-aged males, comparison
data on employers are reported for the years
1966-67, 1967-69, 1969-71, and 1971-
73. Labor turnover can thus be measured
as a binary variable taking a value of one if a
worker quits his or her job in one year and
has a different employer in a later year, and
taking value of zero if that worker does not
change or involuntarily changes employers.
Combining data for the four intervals pro-
vides a sample of 4,408 observations, in-
cluding 177 instances of job quitting.
The variable RESID is calculated by
subtracting individual workers' "potential"
(predicted) wage from their actual wage at
the beginning of a time interval. The pre-
dicted wage is based on the coefficients
from a market wage equation, using the
natural logarithm of the hourly wage as
the dependent variable and including the
following explanatory variables: years of
"Data sources for the concentration and unioniza-
tion variables may be found in footnotes 10 and 11
above.
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schooling; tenure and its square; unioniza-
tion; months of job-related training; and
dummy variables for health, marital status,
race, and geographic region. Since the
turnover observations are pooled by time
intervals, four separate wage equations are
estimated. The wage equation samples are
restricted to private wage and salary em-
ployees in manufacturing and regulated
industries.
Our estimates of the impact of market
structure on voluntary turnover are reported
in Table 3." Since the dependent variable
is dichotomous, the quit equations are esti-
mated with probit analysis. The coefficient
of concentration is negative and highly
significant in both equations, indicating
that the probability of quitting decreases
as concentration rises. In contrast, the co-
efficients of regulation (REG) are positive,
which indicates that individuals employed
in regulated industries are more likely to
voluntarily change employers than workers
in unregulated manufacturing. Equation 2
reveals, however, that the positive impact of
regulation on turnover is statistically sig-
nificant only for MAX- and VAR-iype
regulation.
The coefficients of the remaining vari-
ables carry the predicted signs, and RESID,
TENURE, and UNION are highly signifi-
cant. Since including RESID in the quit
equation holds constant any "wage differ-
ential" incentive for changing employers,
the negative coefficient of C in Table 3 sug-
gests that quitting decreases as concentra-
tion rises because nonwage compensation
is greater in highly concentrated industries
than in competitive industries. This find-
ing is consistent with the estimates in Table
2, which indicate that employer expendi-
tures on pensions and insurance increase
with concentration. The results in Tables 2
and 3 suggest that workers in VAR-regula-
. Probit Analyses of the Effect of Con-
centration and Regulation on Voluntary
Labor Turnover, 1966-73.
(asymptotic lvalues in parentheses)
'*To determine whether our estimates are biased by
pooling different time intervals, we included the
national rate of unemployment during the first year of
each interval as a crude measure of labor market
conditions. This variable was never statistically sig-
nificant and its inclusion had no effect on the market
structure coefficients; it was therefore dropped from
the equation.
Variables
C
REG
MAX
MIN
VAR
RESID
TENURE
UNION
MSP
WHITE
Constant
- 2 X log
likelihood
ratio
N
Equation I
- .0068**
(-3.13)
.3337**
(3.11)
-.2014*
(-2.10)
- .0489**
( - 10.64)
- .0059**
(-2.67)
-.1484
(-1.24)
.0973
(1.13)
-.4761**
(-2.74)
231.36
4408
Equolion 2
-.0111**
(-3.64)
—
.7398**
(2.57)
.0721
(.42)
.5687**
(3.37)
-.1785
(-1.83)
- .0493**
(-10.64)
- .0048*
(-2.06)
-.1545
(-1.24)
.1250
(1.43)
- ,3767*
( - 2.08)
235.95
4408
*Significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Significant at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.
tion industries are relatively more likely to
quit because they receive lower fringe bene-
fits than comparable workers in other regu-
lated industries and manufacturing. The
insignificance of the MIN terms in Tables 2
and 3 implies that setting minimum prices
and restricting market entry raises wages
but does not affect other kinds of labor com-
pensation. The coefficients oiMAX suggest
that regulation in the utility industries re-
duces certain kinds of nonwage compensa-
tion (other than pension and insurance
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payments) and, other things equal, results
in higher labor turnover.'^
Summary and Implications
Previous studies of the effect of con-
centration and industry regulation on labor
compensation have focused predominantly
on wages or earnings while ignoring fringe
benefits and other kinds of nonwage com-
pensation. Consequently, the implications
of those studies regarding the impact of
market structure on total labor earnings
must be considered tentative. In this study,
we have empirically examined the effect of
concentration and regulation on labor
compensation by estimating the deter-
minants of hourly wages, fringe benefits in
the form of employer contributions to pen-
sion and insurance plans, and voluntary
labor turnover. The regression results reveal
a positive and highly significant relation-
ship between concentration and both wages
and fringes, and a significant negative rela-
tionship between concentration and job
quitting. These findings are highly con-
sistent with the hypothesis that, other things
equal, labor compensation is relatively
higher in concentrated industries than in
more competitive ones. Thus, it is rather
ironic that certain members of Congress
with close ties to organized labor, notably
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, have sup-
ported legislation intended to reduce in-
dustrial concentration in the United
States.56
'^These kinds of nonwage compensation could
include vacation and sick-leave pay, bonuses, over-
time premiums, contributions to savings plans,
holiday funds, employee education funds, job security,
and job satisfaction. For information on the various
kinds of fringe benefits, see Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, Employee Benefits 1980; and
Freeman, "The Effect of Unionism on Fringe Bene-
fits." Freeman's data (p. 496) indicate that employer
contributions for pensions and insurance make up
only about 36 percent of measurable voluntary fringe
benefits.
"Opening statement of Edward M. Kennedy in U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committeeon the Judiciary, Mergers
and Economic Concentration, Part 1, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopoly, and
Business Rights (Washington, D.C: GPO, 1979). For
additional discussion, see A. F. Ehrbar, "Bigness
Industry regulations that set minimum
prices and restrict market entry, as in air-
lines and trucking, are estimated to raise
labor compensation by means of increasing
hourly wages. This result implies that the
opposition to deregulation on the part of
the Air Line Pilots Association and the
Teamsters has been well founded. The rela-
tively higher incidence of job quitting
among workers in the utility industries
(telephone, electricity, gas, and water)
suggests that profit regulation through
the imposition of maximum prices reduces
labor compensation. Stronger evidence that
certain kinds of regulation may decrease
labor earnings is contained in the finding
that in the remaining regulated industries,
both wages and fringe benefits are relatively
lower, wbereas voluntary labor turnover is
relatively higher.
The implications of this study for public
policies designed to deconcentrate or de-
regulate industries depend on two issues.
First, has labor quality adequately been beld
constant in the empirical analyses, so that
compensation differentials reflect eco-
nomic rent rather than payment for some
productivity factor? Second, do the empiri-
cal findings for mature men apply to other
groups of workers as well? If we assume
that the relatively higher labor compensa-
tion in concentrated and M/N-regulated
industries constitutes economic rent en-
joyed by the average worker in those indus-
tries, then our findings imply that decon-
centration and deregulation would reduce
unit costs and lead to more efficient re-
source allocation throughout the economy.
The income losses (reduced wages or
fringes) incurred by the workers now em-
ployed in the affected industries would be
more than offset by gains to consumers
and other workers.
The assumption that relatively higher
labor compensation (or profits) represents
economic rent seems more valid in the case
of industries in which entry has been arti-
ficially restricted by regulation tban in
Becomes the Target of the Trustbusters," Fortune, Vol.
99, No. 6 (March 26, 1979), pp. 34- 39.
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highly concentrated, unregulated manu-
facturing. Studies by Brozen, Demsetz, and
others suggest that the relatively high profit
rates in concentrated manufacturing indus-
tries reflect the greater efficiency and tech-
nological advancement of dominant
firms." Kendrick and Grossman find that
the slowdown in manufacturing produc-
tivity growth since the mid-1960s is sig-
"Yale Brozen, "The Significance of Profit Data for
Antitrust Policy," in J. Fred Weston and Sam Peltz-
man, eds.. Public Policy Toward Mergers (Pacific
Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear, 1969), pp. 110-27;
Harold Demsetz, The Market Concentration Doctrine
(Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute,
1973).
nificantly less in more concentrated indus-
tries.'^ The relatively higher wages and
fringe benefits observed in concentrated
industries may thus be compensation for tbe
higher skill levels of workers. Finally, to the
extent that labor turnover raises costs and
retards productivity growth, the finding
that concentration reduces job quitting is
certainly not supportive of public poli-
cies to reduce industrial concentration.
"John W. Kendrick and Elliot S. Grossman, Pro-
ductivity in the United States: Trends and Cycles
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1980), pp. 106-11.

